Analysis: The importance of political consensus

In recent years, the Israeli right, like the right-wing globally, has rediscovered one of the most basic insights in the “war of ideas”: public discourse is not a field with clear boundaries where the right and left compete for public favour. Public discourse itself is a tool for changing consciousness, and its boundaries define what constitutes the political ‘centre’.

As a result, gaining political ground has changed. If once we believed the way of gaining political consensus was to make a compelling case to the “middle”, we now operate in a political world with no apparent middle to convince. So how can we make our ideas a consensus with no middle ground in our discourse? 

In this article, I explore how ‘The Overton Window’ explains how the political ground changes, and how this can be used to realign an Israel suffering through the shocks of judicial reform, attitudes to ‘settlements’, and Judea & Samaria. 

The Overton Window

As usual, the right discovered the following concept later than the left: that the boundaries of discourse could be used to move the public consensus. Activists and politicians on the left wing thus shifted the political basis further and further to the left. The most common description of this phenomenon is called the “Overton Window,” named after the politician Joseph Overton. Overton describes a “window,” or field, where public ideas exist in varying degrees of social acceptance.

At the centre of the window, we find the centre of political consensus. This is what is accepted by society as a whole, by both the right and the left, or at least by enough of them to become policy without significant opposition. On either side of the consensus lies the area of disagreement. These are the things that may be held in consensus within different political camps but are not widely accepted by ‘the other side’, though still not complete anathema to the disagreeing side. For example, socialism may be held in consensus by a variety of groups on the political left, although groups may disagree on its precise nature and implementation, while the political right will consider the same about a free market economy. However, elements of both remain either within the political consensus or hovering at the periphery.

Beyond the areas of disagreement are the extreme positions, which, is implied by their name, are at the edge of the Overton Window. This extreme area is seen as the “line that must not be crossed” by either side, and even those with views in the areas of disagreement will hesitate to express support or sympathy for these extreme views. This is typically due to fear that any expression of these opinions will see the advocate labelled as delusional and thus damage their social standing. 

The Overton Window is the window in which public discourse is possible. It is portrayed as a window on an axis, with anything inside the window being part of public discourse. 

However, this does not mean that our model ends here, because there are two more areas outside the window: things that should not even be discussed. The first of these two areas is those things “that cannot be talked about”, in other words things that cannot be said in public or at all. Unlike the “extreme position” where it is known that a few people hold such views, but these views are too extreme to express, things that are truly “unspeakable” will rarely be said by anyone. While extreme views may appear in public discourse and even receive representation from small political parties, things that cannot be said will be truly hidden from political discourse entirely. 

Beyond “what cannot be said,” there is the final area: things that cannot even be thought about. If the “what cannot be said” area contains ideas that only occasionally come to mind, the final area is even more distant – so far from our attention that they will not even cross our minds and will not require the question “should this be said or not?” 

The ‘Axis’ behind the Window

Until now, I have described the structure of the window and its various areas within and beyond it. Now, let us turn to the ‘axis’ upon which it moves. Usually, the axis stretches between “more freedom for the citizen” and “more government control,” although other issues may also divide political life. This means that if the public adopts positions that allows freedom of action for citizens, ideas promoting government oversight will seem more extreme and less acceptable to voice. Sometimes, the extremes are right-wing and left-wing, and as public opinion moves further right, right-wing ideas once considered extreme, like annexing Judea and Samaria, will become more common in discourse. This, in turn, will push opposition organizations against the settlement of Judea and Samaria further to the edge, and they will receive fewer invitations to news studios and public stages.

The Problem with the Window

The use of the Overton Window helps us understand how the boundaries of public discourse are determined and how we can change them, through the process of moving those things we do not want out of the legitimate realm or bringing things that were extreme into the centre. For example, if we organize a group of people to start talking about a topic that was previously outside the window, and they persist, the topic will move from “not talked about” to “extreme.” On the other hand, if enough people begin to complain about something that was previously held within a consensus, the controversy they create will move the topic from “consensus” to “disputed.” However, the Overton Window in its current form misses an important element of public discourse: when the axis it moves on stretches between two political extremes or two opposing sides of an issue, it assumes that there are two completely distinct groups fighting against each other.

Take, for example, the fight between socialism and the free market, which exists in every democratic country. If this is our axis, what would the extremes be? What would lie beyond the window in the “not talked about” areas? On the socialist side, outside the boundaries of discourse would lie Communism, the total control of the state over all businesses, with issuance and pricing of goods solely determined by the state. On the opposing side, this could be a state of anarchy –a state with no regulations at all, with consumer protection laws non-existent, and manufacturers even allowed to put poison in their products and lie about it. These extremes describe situations that sound bad to all of us, and here lies the problem with this axis: it assumes that socialists and free-market proponents have no shared values. The axis describes a laboratory situation, where a group whose entire world view is composed of complete absence of government pitted against a group whose world view is complete government control. People in each of these camps have no incentive to cooperate – they are simply trying to pull the rope as hard as they can in their direction. People like this cannot live together in the same society because society, by definition, is built on shared values.

So, what shared values do the left and right share in the same country? A lot. Even during times of difficult disputes, there are still shared values – ones we avoid talking about because they are taken for granted, and even ones so deeply ingrained in us that we do not think about them because they are so obvious. And here is where the Overton Window fails: it places consensus in the middle and disagreement on the sides, while a more accurate division would place varying degrees of consensus and varying degrees of disagreement.

My Window, the Overton Window on the Axis of Consensus 

I propose the following model: a discourse window, which, like before, outlines the boundaries of discourse but sits on a consensus axis. The poles of the axis are not two sides of a debate but instead possess varying levels of acceptance of a position or issue. The further the issue is from “unacceptable,” the further it is from discourse and consciousness in our society. The closer an issue is to “acceptable” or “consensus,” the more deeply it is integrated into our society, so much so that we may not even need to think about it. The way to enter or exit the social consensus must go through the discourse window.

The Consensus Axis

Those things that are more familiar but exist outside the discourse window and outside political consensus include ethnic cleansing, dictatorship, rape, and other things no one would dare speak in favour of (for good reason in the examples mentioned). However, what exists outside of discourse and even outside the boundaries of thought, but are still held within the consensus? Things so basic that agreeing on them is inherent within the system and therefore invisible to us. Take, for example, driving direction. What prevents us (physically, not legally) from driving on the left side of the road? (editor’s note, the author is Israeli) It is entirely possible and is even the driving direction in other countries. So why do all drivers in the country drive only on the right-side day after day without even discussing it? Because it is an invisible consensus, one we do not even think about for good reasons. Different parts of our lives require varying levels of agreement with the collective (consensus). For example, we can (and do not really have a choice to) live alongside people who vote for different parties, even if their platform is as totalitarian as Chadash, the Communist Party. But we cannot drive on a road where even one car is going the wrong way. Here, even the smallest deviation from the consensus jeopardizes all the drivers on the road.

The New Discourse Window

Now that the boundaries of discourse and consensus has been explained, how do we move a topic from the status of “accepted” to that of “unacceptable”? Using the discourse window, along with the changes I have made. In Overton’s model, the centre of the window is consensus. In my model, the centre of the window is disagreement. This is more accurate because the issues under contention are at the heart of our discourse. This is where the public battle takes place over which issue can enter or must exit the consensus, and this is where most of the effort of political groups fighting over each issue is concentrated. If the issue gains more support, it will move to the acceptable area, where there will still be those who disagree, but they will be fewer, and most people will not feel a strong enough need to engage with it. If the issue becomes even more acceptable, it will enter the “nothing to discuss” area. Here, the issue will hardly be on the agenda, and anyone who tries to challenge its legitimacy will be seen as delusional or eccentric because there is “nothing to discuss.”

On the other side of the disagreement, an issue that is on its way out and loses in the battle for disagreement will move to the extreme area, where anyone who raises it will be seen as extreme and strange, who should not be given too much power or responsibility. If it loses even more support, it will move to the “nothing to discuss” area on the unacceptable side. In other words, there is nothing to talk about because it is clear to everyone that this idea is unacceptable.

How can an Idea be moved?

After explaining the structure of the new Overton Window and the areas it comprises, this can be used to examine one of the most currently contentious issues in Israeli political discourse: the settlements. 

Originally, this was an area of invisible consensus (in the “not considered” category of consensus), until those on the left-wing succeeded in pulling it back into discourse and even the extreme part of the window.

The establishment of Jewish settlements in the country was a complete consensus until around the 1980s. The left was the pioneer of settlements and established the first settlements, even in Judea and Samaria. The moral question about establishing a Jewish settlement or taking a house that an Arab had fled from, or was even evacuated from, did not exist at all. Still, we all remember the period, even until recently, when merely living in the Judea and Samaria territories labelled you as an extreme and dangerous person, and the same was true for expressing support and the desire to establish more settlements in “Arab” areas of the Land of Israel. 

How did they manage to drag this issue so far from consensus? Let us start from the overarching point: how does something move from a state of not being thought about, to one where it is thought about? They go to another society, with different consensuses, and perhaps someone there will think about these things and might “infect” a visitor with such an idea. This is what happened to some young students who went to study humanities abroad and were exposed to anti-colonial ideas. Of course, there is no such thing as a colony in your homeland, but logic does not play a role in accepting or rejecting ideas. Now, a small group of people who see themselves as educated and part of the greater world think that a Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria is an evil colony. The idea moved from “not considered” to “not said.” So, how does it get moved to “there’s nothing to talk about”? Simply, by starting to talk about it. If a small and determined group of activists start talking about “the evil of the settlements,” the public will think they are crazy and extreme, but still, the mere act of speaking about it introduces this new consensus into the discourse window, even if it is still accepted. From there, if the determined group of anti-settlement activists continues to operate undisturbed, over time the idea of settlements moves from “no need to talk about it” to “acceptable.” This happens because the passage of time makes us accept things as part of reality. If a lane on the road you drive to work is closed, at first it will anger you because it is a direct inconvenience, but if no one reopens the lane, over time, you will get used to the discomfort and stop caring about it, even if the road is closed for an unjustified or even ridiculous reason. The power of habituation plays a central role in battles for consciousness. The rest of the path downward follows the same pattern and requires increasing the number of people shouting against the settlements and more time. The increase in numbers and other manipulations are aided by left-wing media, and since there are no competing social networks or media, the settlements drop through the next two stages in the window until they reach the extreme zone.

An idea that moves upward from “not acceptable” to consensus goes through the same stages in the same way. Its progress towards consensus mainly depends on a determined group of believers who continue to talk about it despite criticism and personal costs in terms of reputation. Of course, if it enters consensus, they can restore and even greatly enhance their reputation, but it is a process that may take decades. An example of such an idea is the current process of judicial reform. At the start, those who supported the need for judicial system changes at the time were considered extreme even within right-wing circles. Over time, however, several things happened that helped push the reform from “not said” to the area of controversy within the Overton Window, and then to status of being “accepted” and necessary. These things were: 

1. A determined group of activists who did not let go of the issue, including Arel Segal, Yariv Levin, and Chaim Ramon. 
2. The creation of media outlets that bypassed the left-wing propaganda machines, primarily social media at first, and Channel 20/14 later. 
3. The courts themselves, who could not resist temptation by increasing and worsening the difficulties they imposed on the public in Israel. 

The combination of these processes meant that judicial reform became an accepted part of discourse, which had not been the case several years ago.

Until now, I have only discussed relative and marketing aspects that affect our consciousness and perception of ideas. In this case, the changing reality was a tremendous helping force in advancing the reform and justified all the claims in its favour.

Did Judicial Reform fail or succeed? 

Both. The judicial reform might have failed as a law because it did not pass, and the issue seemingly is not on the agenda anymore, but it was an unprecedented intellectual success for the Israeli right. On the right wing, although there is a feeling of failure due to the tough divisions the reform caused, this is precisely evidence of its success as an idea. In the revised Overton window, “division” is the central part, meaning only that the size of the division demonstrates that the reform has reached the centre of the discourse, and it has made its way there from the remote zones of “no need to talk about it” and “not said.” Now, as time passes, and the legal system continues to behave with disdain for the law and the will of the people, the three factors that helped the reform get this far continue to push it forward, aided by a fourth factor: the passage of time. The feeling of failure over passing the reform laws comes from our misunderstanding of the progress of ideas. Anyone who remembers the senior members of the judicial system coming to a committee chaired by Simcha Rothman to discuss the reform surely remembers them agreeing that there is a need for change but refusing to say what kind of change that entailed. For most of us, this appeared as arrogance and an attempt to deceive the right-wing public, but it was even more than that. If we remember that these individuals, just a year before the committee, would have considered any talk about reform as the end of democracy, they now agree only that change is needed, albeit amorphous and without details, and thus we can see that the reform is coming closer to consensus even amongst them! Remember, movement on the consensus axis does not have to be related to logic or morality – it is purely a battle over our consciousness. So, even if it is illogical to agree on a change without details, it is a huge step forward from “no need to talk about it,” and this progress was made even by the enemies of the reform.

What now? 

What should set the boundaries of our discourse is not what is acceptable or not acceptable to say, but logic and morality. However, human society is not built for such rapid changes, even if logic and morality justify them. Therefore, consensus is the tool used for making these changes. The new structure I have applied to the Overton window will help us understand how to use discourse to push good ideas into the consensus and remove bad ideas from it. This is what the left has been doing for years, and is also the principle of Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” – ideas that do not meet resistance will embed themselves in society, or, conversely, demonization that does not meet resistance will tarnish its target regardless of truth or justice.

One conclusion according to Jabotinsky is that we must always be ready to oppose, but for this, we do not need the new window I have created. The new window allows us to identify the movement trend of an idea – whether it is moving out of the consensus or inward. The trend shows us whether what we are doing is working, just like in the example of judicial reform, from which we can conclude that despite the “failure” to push through reforms, the idea is indeed making its way to consensus, and we must continue to talk about it. The trend also shows us what level of opposition we need to apply against bad ideas. If a bad idea, like allowing male prisoners to be transferred to women’s prisons, moves from “not said” to “no need to talk about,” it is a sign that it is gaining strength, and we need to intensify our opposition to it. But if a bad idea, such as a Palestinian state, moves from “extreme” to “no need to talk about,” and the amount of mentions in public discourse decreases accordingly, we should reduce our focus on it. If we increase attention to such a topic, the renewed attention could push it back to “extreme” as awareness of the issue rises. A healthy rule for promoting a topic is that if it is outside the consensus, it needs increasing levels of support and engagement until it moves from “division” to “acceptable.” From the “acceptable” stage, it needs decreasing levels of attention, and if attempts are made to undermine it as it moves upward, the method to neutralize the “downward movement” is to ask, “Why are you even talking about this?” and direct attention to the “pointless” issue that is already consigned to the past.

Even though I may have argued that ideas move independently of reality and truth, and that society changes consensus slowly, sometimes an event is so powerful that it shakes the consensus and changes it drastically in an instant. Events that fit these criteria are, for example, those of October 7^th and September 11^th. Although social consciousness is seemingly detached from reality, sometimes, if it is detached enough, reality can force itself onto the consciousness with a sharp, painful, and immediate impact. This is how the organization “Brothers in Arms,” which encouraged conscientious objection to the military in Israel, went from being controversial to “no need to talk about.” The war showed the Israeli public, and especially those on the political left, the practical consequences of refusing to serve. From the organization’s conduct, we can see it understands its new status, as it has abandoned the message of conscientious objection and now tries to rehabilitate its image as a volunteer organization for soldiers. In this situation, where the organization is moving out of the discourse window, it is important to stay vigilant and block any attempts for it to climb back up. How? To exert counter-pressure on any attempts like that of Yotam Zamri, for example, who continues to publish his objection declarations from before the war. If enough people exert this counter-pressure on any attempt by the organization to climb back into acceptability, it will be blocked and fall outside the window of acceptable discourse.

After many examples and explanations, I hope my new Overton window is clear, understandable, and most of all, useful for you. I hope this window will be a tool that serves us and helps push Zionist ideas upward, while removing defeatist ideas. I hope the new window will help us allocate our attention and investment more wisely. Each idea will get the appropriate attention based on its trend and position on the axis, and it will help us manage a battle of ideas that is not only persistent but also smarter.